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One factor that contributes to making people 
poor is the lack of an adequate water supply 
and sanitation. More than 3 billion people in 
developing countries lack sanitation and more 
than a billion lack basic drinking water, causing 
poor quality of life, ill health and less productive 
nations. Most of the unserved citizens live in 
informal settlements in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (Fig. 1 and Table 1).1
Poor households often spend a high propor-
tion of their incomes and incur substantial 
indirect and direct costs in terms of both money 
and time to obtain water from distant sources 
of water or through private vendors.3–9 The 
problems of access to water and sanitation 
services as well as the quality of these services 
Most of the billions of people without drinking water or 
sanitation are very poor. While private-sector companies are 
becoming increasingly involved with infrastructure provision in 
developing countries, their contracts for water and sanitation 
services tend to forget the social aspects of providing services 
to poor people. As such, public–private partnerships in 
particularly poor countries are unlikely to be sustainable in 
the longer term and UN targets for improvements will fail 
to be met. Based on a four-year research project in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, this paper explains how concession 
contracts need to be more suited to the needs, resources 
and aspirations of local impoverished communities—in other 
words, to be more pro-poor.
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Table 1. Poverty and access to water supply and sanitation by global region. Most of the 1.2 billion 
people without safe drinking water live on less than US$1 a day
Poverty indicator East Asia and 
the Pacifi c: % of 
population
Sub-Saharan 
Africa: % of 
population
Latin America and 
the Caribbean: % of 
population
Global 
total: billion 
people
Living on less than 
US$1 a day 23
.7 29.3 5.1 1.1
Without access to 
improved water 
source in 2000
41.4 24.9 6.6 1.2
Without access to 
adequate sanitation 
in 2000
41.5 12.4 5.0 2.7
Source: United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report 20042
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has been recognised, and, under UN Millennium 
Development Goal 7 there is global consensus 
to increase water and sanitation coverage by the 
year 2015 to at least half the number of people 
not covered in 2000.
However, the public sector in many develop-
ing countries has neither the institutional nor the 
fi nancial capacity necessary to meet those tar-
gets.10 Government initiatives for improving the 
infrastructure and delivery of services are hin-
dered by fi nancial constraints, perceptions about 
limited revenue enhancements from investments 
for extending services to the poor, limited under-
standing of the problems and possible solutions, 
and limited incentives for water utilities (public 
or private) to address these problems.11
Over the past few years, practical self-help 
and non-government organisation initiatives 
along with some public utility and private pro-
vider programmes have contributed to under-
standing actions that can be effective in improv-
ing access and services for the poor.12,13 Partly as 
a consequence, the last decade has seen a rise in 
private sector involvement in developing coun-
tries. In the specifi c context of private sector 
participation, the question is: how can contracts 
be made pro-poor?
This paper draws upon a four-year research 
project undertaken in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, including fi eldwork in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Morocco, Argentina 
and Bolivia,14,15 and also on the experience of the 
authors. It argues that regardless of the overall 
general performance of public–private partner-
ship contracts, they rarely focus on the social 
aspects of provision of water and sanitation serv-
ices to marginalised populations. Hence, without 
signifi cant modifi cation, such contracts have not 
and will not address the global agenda directly 
culminating in the Millennium Development 
Goals.
Private sector participation
Experience of private sector involvement in 
developing countries, especially in the water and 
sanitation sectors indicates that private sector 
participation itself does not bring solutions, but 
rather resources, fi nance and a specifi c approach 
to the delivery of urban services. Experience of 
the past few years shows that most cases of more 
successful public–private partnerships have 
been introduced through contractual renegotia-
tions some years after the original arrangement 
started.
Forms of private sector participation in the 
water sector
The public–private partnership contract (or 
agreement) is most often between a municipal, 
state or national public authority and a private 
sector operator or investor. Private sector par-
ticipation in the water sector ranges from service 
contracts, through management, lease and 
concession contracts and in a few cases divesti-
ture.16–22
As the development of private sector partici-
pation becomes more sophisticated, arrange-
ments are frequently hybrids of two or more of 
these standard solutions. The provisions that 
need to be made to improve access and services 
to the poor could to some extent apply in any 
private sector participation model or hybrid.
The institutional context
When water sector, private sector, partici-
pation is introduced, there is seldom a water 
sector institutional and legal framework and, 
even where it exists, shortcomings in either the 
framework or the process can limit the extent 
to which private sector participation attains its 
objectives.23–26 Institutional and legal structures 
that have inadequate provisions to deal with 
land tenure, administrative structures, represen-
tation, health and social security make solutions 
more diffi cult.
A coherent set of legislation (ideally a ‘Water 
Act’) to defi ne the roles and relationships of the 
numerous institutions and stakeholders con-
cerned clearly can create an enabling environ-
ment that can culminate into a stable policy.27 
This is very important if the private sector is 
expected to take serious long-term risks.
Water sector regulation
The regulation of services and of fi nancing 
is an important element of the institutional and 
legal framework. The regulator must ensure 
that all consumers receive the agreed services, 
are charged a fair price, and that the operator 
can make the necessary infrastructure improve-
ments.
Often regulation will be established in paral-
lel with, or following completion of, the private 
sector participation preparation process.28–31 
Certain aspects of the water sector that have 
signifi cant bearing on the nature of regulation 
and consequently of contract design are32,33
■ long planning horizons and high capital 
investment needs
■ poor information about extent and condi-
tion of underground assets
■ poor information about customer (revenue) 
base and extent and types of populations not 
yet served
■ high environmental impact and susceptibil-
ity to changes in environmental policies
■ high social profi le as the provider of an es-
sential service.
Concession contracts
The reason for focussing on the concession 
case is that this is the most common form that 
maximises the transfer of responsibility and risks 
to the private sector. About half of the large 
private sector participation projects that came 
about between 1990 and 1997 in developing 
countries were long-term concession contracts.34
The basis for a pro-poor approach
Private–public partnerships, if looked at as 
partnerships sharing a common goal for all 
stakeholders involved, including the poor, re-
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Fig. 1. Most of the billions of people in the world unserved by drinking water and sanitation live 
in informal settlements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A different approach is needed when 
involving the private sector water and sanitation suppliers
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quire a concessional contractual framework that 
is pro-poor.27,35–38 There is not yet the perfect 
concession contract, but of all the forms of pri-
vate sector participation, excluding divestiture, 
the concession is the one in which outputs, rath-
er than means of achievement, are most strongly 
the core objectives.
In a concession contract, all the necessary du-
ties and powers to operate, invest in the system 
(including expansion to the poor) and collect 
revenues are transferred to the private operator, 
along with the exclusive right to use the sector’s 
existing assets for those purposes. The non-own-
ership transfer feature is also the most politically 
saleable option in the developing world. Given 
the right political climate, experts view conces-
sions as the most desirable vehicles for increased 
investment and effi ciency.39–42
A concession contract, if designed correctly, 
can provide maximum fl exibility for improving 
services without transferring asset ownership 
to the private sector.39,42–46 For a concession 
contract, therefore, the primary roles of the 
regulator will be to monitor performance, and 
to interpret the contract and adjudicate on the 
adjustments required in response to changes in 
circumstances. Such regulation should provide 
the fl exibility and adaptability needed to solve 
the problems of the poor and should be rec-
ognised in the overall legal framework for the 
water sector. Governments in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Morocco, Argentina 
and Bolivia have been entering public–private 
partnerships for enhancing access and quality of 
water supply and sanitation.
Basis for the review and subsequent analysis
Solutions for services improvement must 
encompass the technical methods available and 
the organisational and institutional provisions 
necessary to support them. Successful solutions 
will be both effective and sustainable. The iden-
tifi cation of effective solutions is mainly related 
to local circumstances, whereas the sustain-
ability of those solutions is more often related 
to sector-level provisions, including institutional 
frameworks and mechanisms. The two require-
ments—effectiveness and sustainability—have to 
be provided for by the concession contract and 
by regulatory mechanisms.
Sustainability of effective infrastructure options
Public–private partnerships are viable for 
the different technical options of water supply, 
sanitation and sewage disposal, including indi-
vidual house connections, yard tanks, dedicated 
customer, yard or communal taps, communal 
standpipes, water kiosks, water vending or water 
tankers for water supply and full waterborne or 
condominium sewerage, septic tanks, on-plot 
latrines or public toilet blocks for sanitation. The 
factors that have to be considered in identifying 
effective solutions for a settlement include
■ poverty and affordability of the residents
■ socio-cultural beliefs and usage patterns
■ local topographic and resource availability
■ proximity of infrastructure networks
■ political environment.
Sector-level success factors
Sustainability, as determined by provisions at 
sector level, will depend on
■ inclusivity
■ feasibility
■ bankability.
Inclusivity
Inclusivity means that solutions must be 
provided for all of the population, including 
the poorest, in all locations and of whatever 
means and circumstances; and that all institu-
tions concerned with development, fi nance and 
welfare must be included in the agreement of 
actions. These factors must be incorporated into 
legislation, agreements, guarantees and contract 
provisions. The main factors to be considered 
for satisfactory solutions are
■ effective information
■ institutional preparation
■ operator perceptions and proposals
■ scope of regulation.
Feasibility
If local solutions are to be incorporated into a 
stable contract at the sector level, contractual and 
institutional mechanisms must be based on a fea-
sible model of development, service levels, costs, 
revenue security, fi nancing and public subsidy.
Feasibility means a contract design that will 
convince a private operator that the contract 
performance requirements can be achieved, that 
risks are appropriately shared and manageable, 
and that the operator will be able to achieve its 
commercial objectives. Some of the key elements 
are summarised below.
■ The concession must operate on the basis of 
adequate income.
■ The information base for the utility and the 
environment in which it is to operate must 
be suffi cient to support the objectives of 
the concession and must be the basis for 
pricing.
■ The contracted rate of expansion and service 
improvements must be realistic.
■ Business projections must assume that 
planned levels of service for stated areas will 
not be changed without commensurate in-
creases in tariffs or other sources of fi nance.
■ The operator must be able to see that the 
projected revenue stream is dependable. 
There are three major factors in this re-
spect—the size of the customer base, tariff 
levels and recourse in the event of non-pay-
ment by customers.
Bankability
In order to attract fi nance, the complete 
package of the contract and related legislative 
provisions, agreements and guarantees must be 
cohesive and consistent with the feasible project. 
Assessment of the bankability of a proposed 
concession will be the concern of all those who 
expect to fi nance it or to provide guarantees. 
These stakeholders will include shareholders in 
the operator’s consortium (or special purpose 
company), commercial investors and lenders, 
international funding agencies and government.
Bankability will depend upon the legal, in-
stitutional and fi nancial provisions and on the 
fi nancial feasibility of the contract. These fac-
tors should be demonstrated by a complete and 
consistent package of legislation agreements and 
guarantees, which will share risks appropriately 
and reduce the risks of investment to an accept-
able level commensurate with the return.
Local-level success factors
At the local level, success factors can be 
grouped under the three broad headings of
■ functionality
■ affordability
■ appropriateness.
Functionality
An effective technical option will need to be 
functional, as well as affordable and responsive 
to local conditions. The technical solution must 
deliver water supply of acceptable quality that is 
adequately accessible and reliable, and sewage 
disposal that provides acceptable standards of 
hygiene and privacy.
The term functionality means the potential for 
each option to meet the requirements for
■ water quality, accessibility and reliability
■ hygiene and privacy of sewerage disposal.
Affordability
Solutions and charges must be affordable, 
and payment methods must assist consumers in 
managing their limited fi nancial resources. The 
main factors to be considered in satisfying the 
affordability criterion are
■ minimising costs
■ tariff structure, subsidy and credit
■ payment methods
■ willingness to pay.
Appropriateness
Appropriate solutions must recognise or ad-
dress conditions in poor areas, including institu-
tional and socio-cultural factors and need to fi t 
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physical and fi nancial conditions (as above) and 
the social and institutional circumstances at the 
local level. These circumstances can be defi ned as
■ permanence of community
■ land tenure
■ community organisation
■ secondary providers.
Case studies
Buenos Aires, Argentina
A 30-year concession was awarded to Aguas 
Argentinas in 1993 for water and sanitation 
provision to almost 10 million people in Buenos 
Aires. Under the original contract, all consumers 
shared primary distribution costs, whereas new 
consumers paid individually for secondary distri-
bution (infrastructure charges) and connections. 
However, most of the unconnected population 
had low or middle incomes and the secondary 
charges were relatively high.
In later renegotiations, the infrastructure 
charges were spread over all consumers and 
connection charges were made payable by instal-
ments. In this case, pro-poor measures were 
introduced through joint efforts of the operator, 
the community, the municipality and non-gov-
ernment organisations after the contract had 
been awarded.
Manila East, Philippines
In 1997, the Government of the Philippines 
entered into two 25-year concessions. The con-
cession for the east zone was awarded to the 
Manila Water Company, which established the 
‘Tubig Para sa Barangay’ (Water for the Village) 
programme. This scheme provides legal connec-
tions to poor communities who live in crowded, 
densely populated areas where it is diffi cult to 
install conventional water pipes.
Banks of meters have been installed, to which 
each household can connect its own fl exible 
pipe (Fig. 2). Alternatively, cluster and bulk 
meters have been installed. The programme 
was not envisaged in the original contract, but 
was agreed by the regulator and concessionaire 
in response to a perceived need. It serves poor 
areas including around 400 000 consumers, and 
has increased income to the operator.
La Paz–El Alto, Bolivia
A 25-year concession was signed in 1997 for 
La Paz, the administrative capital of Bolivia, and 
El Alto, a low-income neighbouring town. In 
order to reduce costs to poor consumers, a pilot 
project was started in 1998 to identify and test 
innovative systems to provide water supply and 
sanitation.
The condominium system uses small diameter, 
shallow pipes laid at fl at gradients in properties, 
yards or footpaths. Maintenance and control of 
the system by the operator would be diffi cult 
because of access to properties, so responsibil-
ity is passed to house owners for the upkeep of 
services passing through their own properties.
Installation costs are recovered from consum-
ers with instalments paid over fi ve years with no 
interest. In this case, condominium systems re-
duced costs to between one-quarter and one-third 
of the cost of conventional systems. The disadvan-
tage, from an operator’s point of view, is that the 
reliability of service depends on the community 
using and maintaining the system properly.
Conclusion
Incorporating pro-poor provisions into a 
concession contract requires a balance between 
fulfi lling public policy and not compromising 
the commerciality of the transaction and service 
delivery. Though the discussion is focussed on a 
concession contract, it can be applied to other 
forms of long-term contract such as a lease or a 
combination lease and management contract.
Concession-type contracts have now been in 
existence for at least a decade. There are also 
various styles and conventions emanating from 
differing parts of the world, and it is important 
to tailor the product to suit the understanding 
and expectations of the participants. Bankability 
is key to successful implementation. What may 
be acceptable to a concessionaire may not be 
acceptable to its fi nancier, and this in turn risks 
failure of the whole process.
An effective concession contract is only the 
‘front-end’ of substantial institutional change. 
That change will be enshrined in legislation and 
inter-entity agreements and guarantees. The con-
cession company itself will be formed and will 
operate under numerous internal agreements—
between the international operators, sharehold-
ers in the special purpose company, fi nanciers, 
suppliers and constructors. The contract and all 
other acts, agreements and guarantees must be 
cohesive and consistent in all respects, including 
provisions concerning the poor.
The authors have reviewed the conditions 
necessary to enable a commercially successful 
concession to also be pro-poor. Two of these 
conditions are stressed again
■ clear defi nitions of service areas, service 
targets and technical standards for the poor
■ robust arrangements for payment and/or 
subsidies or other support for services to the 
poor.
In an environment of ineffi cient contract 
enforcement, which exists in most of the devel-
oping countries, the onus to make any contract 
deliver effectively lies on the partners’ goodwill 
and commitment to the objectives of the con-
tract. Collaborative and partnering approaches 
are the key to a successful running of a conces-
sion contract.
PRO-POOR CONCESSIONS FOR 
SUSTAINABLE WATER SERVICES
19C I V I L E N G I N E E R I N G
Fig. 2. In poor parts of Manila, the water 
concessionaire has installed banks of water 
meters to which households can legally con-
nect their own supply pipes
Incorporating 
pro-poor 
provisions into 
a concession 
contract requires 
a balance 
between fulfilling 
public policy and 
not compromising 
the commerciality 
of the transaction
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